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Abstract 
 
In all legal systems based on common law, limitation period plays an 
important part in all its civil actions. Failure on part of the parties who 
commence legal action in court within the stipulated limitation period, the 
legal action concerned would be barred and could be proceeded. The 
limitation period for all actions founded on contract pursuant to section 6 
of the Malaysian Limitation Act 1953 is 6 years. However, based on the 
decided cases, the limitation period for action of specific performance of a 
contract of sale of land, notwithstanding that this action is unequivocally 
founded on contract, is 12 years, not 6. This is because all actions for 
specific performance of contract of sale of land were and are held in the 
decided cases to be actions ‘to recover land’.  Pursuant to section 9 of the 
Limitation Act 1953 all actions for the recovery of land, their limitation 
period is 12 years. However, in the author’s view, the limitation period of 
action for specific performance of contract of sale and purchase of land 
should instead of 12 years, be 6 years as well, as this action too is an 
action founded on contract. However this is contrary to the judgements 
found in the decided cases. This article examines these cases and also 
provides the grounds to support the contrary contention of certain learned 
legal author in regard to the limitation period of specific performance for 
contract of sale of land. This article will attempt to unveil and study the 
grounds and policies of the courts concerning the issue. 
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Definition 
Specific Performance means, ‘a decree issued by the court that the defendant shall 
actually perform and carry out the promise that he has made, or the obligation, expressly 
or impliedly, cast upon him by the conduct between the parties’.1 
 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy in English law.2 According to ICF Spry 
although the granting of this remedy largely depends on the discretion of the court (as 
this remedy was originally an equitable remedy not provided by statutes), where no party 
in any litigation may pray for it, now, it is clear that the court, in applying this remedy in 
its judicial process, is manned and ingrained by specific rules to ensure that this equitable 
relief is suitably granted to any party in the litigation proceedings.3 
 
The Governing Act 
The Act which governs and provides specific performance in Malaysia is the Specific 
Relief Act 19504 (revised in 1974)(Act 137) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’). 
                                                 
1
 G.C. Cheshire & C.H.S. Fifoot, The Law of Contract, 2nd Edition, Australian Edition, by J.G. Starke QC 
& P.F.P Higgins, Butterworth, Sydney, 1969, p. 771. 
 
2
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Singapore, Butterworth, 1984, p. 
414. See also Chitty on Contracts, General Principles (25th Edition) chapter 27. See also cases, namely Re 
Schwabacher (1908) 98 LT 127, 28; Waring & Gillow v. Thompson (1912) 29 TLR, 154; Ryan v. Mutual 
Tontine Association (1893) 1 Ch. 116. 
 
3
 Spry, ICF, The Principles of Equitable Remedies, Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and 
Equitable Damages (2nd Edition 1980), Sweet & Maxwell, England, pp 4 and 5.  This has been stated in 
Lamare v. Dixon (1873) LR 6, 414, 423 where it has been stated in principle that: 
 
‘The discretion to refuse specific performance is ‘not an arbitrary…discretion but one to 
be governed as far as possible by fixed rules and principles’ 
 
According to section 11 of the Specific Relief Act 1950, specific performance can be granted in matters 
pertaining to breach of contract to transfer immovable property where it is not sufficiently be remedied by 
damages: Zaibun S binti Syed Ahmad v. Loh Koon May & Anor (1982) 2 MLJ, p 92 (PC). Similarly, this 
relief could not also be granted in the executory contracts: Mohamad v. Ho Wai (1961) MLJ, p. 7 and 
where actual loses could not be ascertained: Gan Realty Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v Nicholas & Ors (1969) 2 MLJ, 
p. 110. Under section 58 of the Sale of Goods Ordinance(Malay States) 1957, the courts have discretions to 
grant the application of the plaintiff for the order of specific performance on the default of contract by the 
defendant in the delivery of certain goods. Amongst the examples where the court is required to grant the 
relief is where the relief is only granted if it is prayed for by the parties in the litigation: Ardeshir Mamma 
v. Flora Sassoon AIR 1928, PC, p. 208., also where the grant of damages will not bar the grant of specific 
performance: Zaibun S binti Syed Ahmad v. Loh Koon Moy & Anor (1982) 2 MLJ, p, 92 and in Lee Hoy & 
Anor v Chen Chi (1971) 1 MLJ, p. 76, where it was held that the application of the plaintiff for specific 
performance has barred him from obtaining damages pursuant to section 18 Specific Relief Ordinance 
(Malay States) 1950. 
 
4
 For example section 19 states that: 
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This Act orginates from the Indian Specific Relief Act 1877, whereof thereafter, it had 
been amended by the Specific Relief Act 1926.5 The Indian Specific Relief Act actually 
came from the established equitable principles as adopted and practised in England. The 
Indian 1877 Act was first drafted by Whitley Stokes, who also had referred to the draft of 
New York Code of 1862, which provided similar principles. This code was actually been 
introduced in India by a well known equity lawyer - Lord Hobhouse, who was also a 
member of the Indian Royal Legislative Council.6 
 
Pursuant to section 21 of the said Act, the application of this remedy is completely 
subject to the discretion of the court and in carrying and applying this remedy, the court 
shall not be bound to the issue of its legality. However, according to Visu Sinnadurai the 
application of this discretion should only be applied based on reasonable and good 
grounds controlled by judicial principles. This order too should be rectifiable by the 
Appellate Courts, if it is found expedient to do so.7 
 
Situations Where Specific Performance Cannot Be Granted 
 
There are situations where order for specific performance cannot be granted pursuant to 
sections 208(this section states certain circumstances where it is not practical for the court 
to grant order for specific performance) and 219(this section spells out the circumstances 
where the court would not grant order for specific performance if the order would lead to 
unwarranted and unreasonable hardship to the parties) of the said Act. Besides these 
sections, there is another situation where specific performance cannot also be granted viz 
when a legal action founded on contract praying for specific performance of the contract 
 
‘A contract, otherwise proper to be specifically enforced may be so enforced though a 
sum be named in it as the amount to be paid in case of its breach, and the party in default 
is willing to pay the same’ 
 
5
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Singarpore, Butterworth, 1984, 
p.414. 
 
6
 Ibid. 
 
7
 Ibid, p.  415. See also end note no. 3. 
 
8
 This section lists down certain particular situations where the courts could not practically and justifiably 
grant order of specific performance as the contract could not be enforced. Amongst the situations are, 
where contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief, contract 
which involved minutest details which is not practical for enforcement, contract which have uncertainty of 
its terms, contract which in its nature is revocable etc. 
 
9
 According to this section, the courts have the discretionary power to grant order of specific performance 
under certain circumstance. However, in certain circumstances the court would not order for specific 
performance of a contract if the situations render them not to enforce it because it is expedient to do so. For 
example where the contract may involve unfair terms and would be unjust to the other party of the 
proceeding if the order for specific performance is granted to other and where the granting of the order for 
specific performance would cause unwarranted and unfair hardship to the other party. 
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is instituted beyond 6 or 12 years from the accrual of the cause of action. This is so 
pursuant to sections 6 and 9 of the Limitation Act 1953. 
 
 
 
 
Limitation Period 
 
According to section 6 (1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Limitation Act’),  provides that for action founded on contract, the action cannot be 
instituted beyond 6 years from the date the accrual of the cause of action.10 Cause of 
action arising from a contract here means circumstances where a party in a contract 
obtains the rights and grounds to institute legal action against the other party who has 
defaulted the terms and conditions of the contract.11 For the cause of action to occur, 
there must have been breach of the contractual duty.12 Cause of action also means ‘a right 
to sue’. There cannot be ‘right to sue’ until and unless there is an accrual of the right 
asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to 
infringe that the right of the defendant against whom the suit is instituted13.  
 
 
The Issue and Objective 
 
In so far as the statutory provision relating to the limitation period for action founded on 
contract is concerned, section 6 (1) of the Limitation Act 1953 provides that:  
‘Save in hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought 
after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action 
accrued, that is to say- 
 
(a) actions founded on a contract…’ 
 
On the other hand, in respect of action for specific performance of a contract, 
section 6(6) of the Limitation Act provides that its limitation period shall the the 
                                                 
10
 See also section III, Limitation Act 1623 for Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales; section 
5(1)(a) Limitation of Actions Act 1958 for Victoria; section  9(1)(a) Limitation Act 1960 for Queensland; 
section 35(a) Limitation of Actions Act 1936 for South Australia; section 38(1)(c)(v) Limitation Act  1935 
for West Australia; section 38(1)(c)(v), Limitation Act 1935 for West Australia; and section 3 Mercantile 
Law Act 1935 for Tasmania. This are stated by G.C.F Cheshire & C.H.S. Fifoot, The Law of Contract, 2nd 
Edition, Australian Edition, by J.G. Starke QC & P.F.P Higgins, Butterworth, Sydney, 1969, p. 789. 
 
11
 Hamid Sultan bin Abu Backer, Janab’s Key To Civil  Procedure In Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd Edition, 
Janab(M) Sdn. Bhd., 1995, p.158. 
 
12
 Ibid. 
 
13
 See ratio of Alauddin Mohd Sheriff J in Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Bhd v. Khor Kia Fong & Ors(1997) 
5 CLJ 428,  at p. 431 
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same period as that being prescribed by the provisions of section 6. Section 6(6) 
states as follows: 
 
‘…the provision of this section shall apply (if necessary by analogy) to all 
claims for specific performance of a contract…whether the same be 
founded upon any contract….’ 
 
Thus, this provision (section 6(6)) means and it is submitted that, the limitation 
period for action of specific performance of any contract would also be 6 years. 
The word ‘any contract’ here, includes the contract of sale of land too. Thus, in all 
action for specific performance due to breach of contract of sale of land, it 
limitation period shall also be 6 years.  
  
Yet, it is surprising to note that, based on the decided cases, the limitation period of 
action for specific performance of a contract of sale of land, instead of 6 years as 
apparent from the statutory footing provided in section 6(1) and section 6(6) of the 
Limitation Act 1953, is held to be 12 years. This is because this type of action viz action 
for specific performance of a contract of sale of land, even though founded on contract, it 
is regarded as an action to ‘recover land’. The limitation period for action to recover land 
is 12 years pursuant to section 9(1) of the Limitation Act.  Section 9(1) of the Limitation 
Act 14 provides that: 
 
‘No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the 
expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action 
accrued to him or if it first accrued to some person through whom he 
claims, to that person’ 
 
The questions for us to ponder and to think about are: 
 
1) Why should limitation period for action of specific performance of 
contract of sale of land be 12 years rather than 6?; 
2) What is the scope of section 6(1) and section 6(6) which provides for the 
limitation period of action founded on contract must be made within 6 
years?; 
3) Alternatively what is the scope of section 9(1)?. and, 
4) What are the grounds that persuade the court to hold the limitation period 
for action of specific performance of contract of sale of land shall be 12 
years pursuant to section 9(1) and not 6 pursuant to section 6(1) or section 
6(6)?. 
 
This paper is to study the above questions and to suggest certain legal contention relating 
to limitation period of specific performance of contract of sale of land in Malaysia. 
 
                                                 
14
 Similar to section 4(3) of the English Act. 
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The Cases 
 
It was found in the decision of the Federal Court in Nasri v. Mesah,15 in relation to the 
limitation period of action for specific performance of contract of sale of land, where 
Gill, FCJ had put this: 
‘It follows, therefore, that whether the action is for specific performance 
of an agreement for the sale of land or for declaration of title to land, it is 
essentially an action to recover land, so that the period of limitation would 
be 12 years in either case’16 
 
Both judges Choong and Ali FCJJ agreed with this opinion. The opinion of Gill J, was 
made in accordance with the principles of the previous two cases. The case was, firstly, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ponnusamay & Anor v. Nathu Ram.17 In this case, 
a contract of sale and purchase of land had been entered into in August 1944. The vendor  
(respondent) had executed a transfer in the statutory form. Before the purchaser passed 
away, the purchaser had made a will appointing and allowing the appellant to register the 
transfer, which was yet to be registered unto the purchaser’s name. Not long after the will 
was made the purchaser died in 1949.  Now the appellant wanted to register the transfer 
in accordance with the purchaser’s will. On this, the appellant had, in 1956, after the 
death of the purchaser, taken an action to declare the said land and prayed for an order 
that the authorities do register the said land unto the name of the purchaser as the 
proprietor. The trial judge found that as the action of the appellant was taken beyond the 
period of 6 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, the action by the 
appellant was statute barred.   
 
In the Court of Appeal, Thompson CJ said that, relating to Ponnusamy, regardless of 
whether the limitation period in this was 6 years pursuant to section 6 or 12 years 
pursuant to section 9(1), it was all dependent upon the form of the plaintiff’(appellant’s) 
claim. His lordship said that what was claimed by the plaintiff was a declaration that they 
were entitled to get back the said land. Hence, the action of the plaintiff was for recovery 
of land according to the meaning of section 9 of the Limitation Ordinance.18 His Lordship 
further made the following consideration and this was concurred upon by Rigby and 
Hepworth JJ: 
 
‘As I put it colloquially this morning in the course of discussion with 
counsel, what the plaintiffs are doing is this. They are coming to the court 
and saying ‘we are entitled to this land and we want this land’. And if the 
                                                 
15
 (1971) 1 MLJ, p. 32. 
 
16
 Ibid, p. 36. 
 
17
 (1959) 1 MLJ, p. 46. 
 
18
 Ibid, at p. 88. Section 9 of the Limitation Ordinance is similar to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953.   
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court is in agreement with them that they are entitled to the land and 
should be given the land, one appropriate way of giving it to them, in view 
of the provisions of the Land Code, is to make the declaration asked for 
and the consequential order on the registering authority. That reasoning 
leads me to the conclusion that this is an action to recover land within the 
meaning of s. 9 of the Limitation Ordinance (No 4 of 1955). Having 
reached the conclusion that this is an action to recover land it seems to me 
impossible to avoid the further conclusion that the case falls within section 
9(1) of the Limitation Ordinance. Section 6(1) of the Ordinance provides 
that in the case the action founded on a contract the period of limitation 
shall be six years but that provision is expressly stated to be ‘save as 
hereinafter provided’. By section 9, however, it is expressly provided that, 
subject to certain exceptions which are not relevant here, the period in 
relation to actions to recover any land shall be twelve years and it is clear 
that this applies to all actions to recover land irrespective of whether they 
are founded on contract or otherwise’19 
 
In Ng Moh v. Tan Bok Kim20 – the plaintiff had been allowed to take action within 12 
years after the accrual of the cause of action,  as long as the action is made for the 
recovery of land either it is made through an action for the declaration of land or  by way 
of specific performance. In this case, the purchaser claimed for a specific performance to 
the contract of sale entered into on the last 15 years. The cause of action was accrued to 
the purchaser 5 years later, viz 10 years before the present action was taken by the 
plaintiff. The Federal Court decided that, without considering and without further 
examining the applicability of the period of limitation period, had accepted the contention 
of the counsels that ‘for an action to recover land, the limitation period is 12 years’.21 
 
In Ponnusamy, the plaintiff had paid all the purchase prices and a transfer in the form of 
statutory had also been executed by the vendor but only awaiting the registration of the 
transfer be effected. This was prolonged for a considerable number of years. The action 
of the purchaser in this case was to obtain an order of declaration for his rights on the 
land and further to cause the registration of transfer of the land be effected in his favour. 
Thompson CJ found that the said action was meant to recover the land. His Lordship said 
that the action of the plaintiff, regardless whether the plaintiff was entitled to the land and 
thus ensued that he would get the land or not, a declaratory order should be prayed for. 
His Lordship decided that the said action was to recover the land and thus the limitation 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 
 
20
 (1969) 1 MLJ, p. 46. However, Azmi LP did not refer to any statute or provision in the Limitation Act. 
His Lordship only emphasized that in ascertaining the limitation period of an action for specific 
performance, the limitation period is 12 years. See at p 4 of the same case. It is ironically submitted that 
this is wrong. 
 
21
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Butterworths, Singapore, 1984 p. 
47. 
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period of 12 years as provided in section 9 of the Limitation Act applied and not 6 years 
under section 6(1). His Lordship relied upon the opinion of Buckley J in Williams v. 
Thomas:22 
 
‘It has been argued, and I think, successfully…the expression ‘to recover 
any land’ in section 2 of the (Real Property Limitation Act 1883) does not 
meant regain something which the plaintiff previously had and has lost, 
but mean ‘obtain any land by judgment of the Court’, yet it is not limited 
to the meaning ‘obtain possession of any land by judgment of the Court.23 
 
Further, Thompson CJ said, in the same case, that as the result of the plaintiff’s 
application praying for an order ‘…to recover…land through the judgment of the court’, 
means that the his action is to ‘recover land’ and this ensues that it falls within section 9 
of the Limitation Ordinance and not section 6. Thus, the applicable limitation period in  
this action is 12 years not 6. 
 
Likewise in Ho Ah Kim & Ors lwn. Paya Trubong Estate Sdn. Bhd.24 where, Mohamed 
Dzaiddin J decided that action for specific performance of sale and purchase of contract 
of land is made in accordance with section 9(1). Therefore the limitation period of  action 
for specific performance is 12 years. Mohamed Dzaiddin J said: 
 
‘In my judgment, in an action for specific performance of an agreement 
for the sale of land, section 9(1) of the Limitation Act applies. Despite the 
comment of the learned author Professor Visu Sinnadurai’s ‘Sale and 
Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia’ 1984 Ed P 440, I am still bound 
by the decision of the Federal Court in Tan Swee Lan v. Engku Nik Binti 
Engku Muda & Ors (1973) 1 MLJ, 187 where Nasri’s case was 
considered.’25 
 
Another case is Tan Shiang Shong v. Tan Lee Choon & Anor26, whereby in this case a 
contract was entered into by the beneficiaries, on the property of two deceased owners for 
a transfer of land registered under the name of the deceased owners, with a purchaser. At 
the time the contract was entered into and executed, the said land was yet to be registered 
                                                 
22
 (1909) 1Ch. 713. 
 
23
 At page 730. Buckley J brought an analogy between action of the mortgagee for an auction and action by 
a widow for enforcing her rights on her deceased husband’s property. See also Vandeleur v. Sloane (1919) 
1 Ir Rep 116, in particular at page 129, CA where it was decided that action of declaration for recovery of 
land under a will was regarded as an action for recovery of land. This case had also been referred to in 
Nasri v. Mesah (1971) 1 MLJ, p. 32. 
 
24
 (1987) 1 MLJ 143 
 
25
 Ibid, pp, 146 - 147. 
 
26
 (1985) 2 MLJ, p. 369 
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in the name of the deceased. In this case, no contract of sale and purchase was ever 
entered into by the parties nor had the purchase price been paid nor the  possession of the 
said land been delivered to the purchaser. Only the extract of title of the land had been 
given to the purchaser. Exaberating this, the purchaser did not take any action to recover 
the possession of the land except until 12 years later when he filed an action for specific 
performance to get back the land. Of course, the judge rejected the action. Yet, the 
purchaser appealed to the Federal Court. The Federal Court found that the purchaser did 
not have any interest in the land enabling him to have the right to transfer the said land 
into his name pursuant to the provisions in the Land Code. His action was barred by 
section 9(1) of the Limitation Act. This was because the action was taken after 12 years 
from the accrual of the cause of action. 
 
Similarly, Ahmad bin Said v. Nacharamal D. Subramaniam Servai Kr. Kt. Supramaniam 
& Ors27 demonstrated that an application for specific performance of a contract of sale of 
land was held to be an action ‘…to ‘obtain’…land by judgement of the court; and being 
such a cause of action…it falls within section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 which, 
inter alia, bars any action being brought by any person to recover land after the 
expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accorded to the 
plaintiff’. In this case, inter alia there were two actions instituted by the plaintiff, one by 
way of originating summons and another was by way of writ of summons. One of the 
actions, which concerns our discussion here is, the writ of summons issued by the 
plaintiff (Ahmad Said) which prayed that: 
 
a. a declaration to the effect that the transfer of the land by the first three defendants, 
as the beneficiaries or predecessors in title of the estate of one Servei deceased 
(husband of the first defendant and father of the second and third defendants)  and 
as the co-proprietors of the land, to Chokkalingam (fourth defendant), was null 
and void on the ground that the first three defendants had fraudulently transferred 
the land to Chokkalingam (fourth defendant) and that Chokkalingam fraudulently 
accepted the transfer of the same to defeat the plaintiff’s rights under the 
agreement of sale of land entered into between the plaintiff and Servei in 1951 on 
the consideration of RM 800 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said agreement’); and, 
b. It should ensue that, an order for specific performance of the said agreement, be 
granted by the court, against the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. 
 
The agreement entered into in 1951 between one Servai and the plaintiff showed that: 
a. Servai had agreed that the plaintiff occupies the land immediately upon execution 
of the said agreement; 
b. That the land was in the name of one Harun who had died; 
c. That Harun had agreed to transfer the said land to Servai before he died; 
d. That Servai would take steps to obtain an order from the High Court, to transfer 
the said land to the plaintiff within five months from the date of the execution of 
the said agreement; and, 
                                                 
27
 (1989) 1 CLJ 214(Rep) (1989) 2 CLJ 1192. 
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e. That if the transfer of the land to the plaintiff was not obtained within the five 
months stipulated, Servai shall refund the RM 800 paid by the plaintiff together 
with RM 100 damages. 
However, Servai failed to transfer the land to the plaintiff in 1951. The plaintiff did 
nothing on this and only on 20 February 1985 did he discover that the land in question 
was distributed to the three defendants as the beneficiaries to Servai and that they had 
fraudulently sold the land to Chokkalingam. Knowing this, the plaintiff brought the 
present action, which was only filed in 1986. 
 
The presiding judge, the learned KC Vohjah J found that the action of the plaintiff was 
statute barred in that he should have brought the action for specific performance within 
12 years from the cause of action, pursuant to section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953, 
which occurred when Servei did not transfer the land into his name in 195128 and this was 
known to him, yet he still did nothing. Instead after some 34 years later, on the 
knowledge that the land in question was transferred to Chokkalingam in 1985 in which 
the plaintiff alleged that this was done fraudulently, from the accrual of the cause of 
action did he file the action for specific performance. On this his lordship dismissed the 
plaintiff’s action. 
 
In Saw Gaik Beow v. Cheong Yew Weng & Ors29 involved an action for specific 
performance of a sale and purchase of a house. In this case, Edgar Joseph Junior J(as he 
then was), decided that because the action for specific performance had been taken within  
12 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action,  the action was legal and 
enforceable pursuant to section 9. This was because an action for specific performance of 
a contract or for a declaration of ownership on the land is regarded as an action for  
recovery of land.  
                                                 
28
 However it is submitted, with due respect, that this is not the proper cause of action on the ground that 
the cause of action should have occurred when there is infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal 
threat to infringe the plaintiff’s right by the defendants. In this case, it is submitted that, the cause of action 
did not occurr in 1985 when the plaintiff knew that the land in question was distributed to the three 
defendants and later transferred to Chokkalingam, but it occurred when the acts of the defendants gave rise 
to a ‘clear and unequivocal threat to infringe the plaintiff’s right’ and thus should ensue that the cause of 
action should have commenced when the defendant filed defence to the plaintiff’s action. See Padang Serai 
Kilang Kayu Bhd v. Khor Kia Fong & Ors (1997) 5 CLJ 428, where the cause of action did not occur when 
the owner (also then being one of the partners of the plaintiffs) of the land on which the plaintiffs’ factory 
stood, died or when the sale agreement of the land to purchase the land by the plaintiffs on or before 30 
November 1970, being the date of the completion of the agreement, nor should the cause of action occur 
after the letter of administration to distribute the assets of the deceased extracted BUT the cause of action 
occurred when the defendants filed their defence to the plaintiff’s action on 14 April 1991. Only that would 
constitute an ‘unequivocal threat to infringe the right of the plaintiff’. Similarly in Ibrahim Musa v. Bahari 
Nayan (1990) 2 CLJ 131 (Rep) (1990) 2 CLJ 223 where KC Vohrah J said that:’’…For purposes of 
limitation in action like this one,…time runs from the date of infringement or at least a clear and 
unequivocal threat to infringe that right….Service of the writ on the defendant constituted plaintiff’s 
intention to stand on his legal right under the agreement…and there was no threat to infringe that right until 
the defence was filed.’ 
 
29
 (1989) 3 MLJ, p. 301 
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Likewise in Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Bhd. v. Khor Kia Fong & Ors30 where this case 
involved an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendants for specific 
performance of a verbal agreement to transfer a piece of land to the plaintiff. The land 
was registered in the names of the defendants as beneficiaries of the deceased. By a sale 
and purchase agreement between the deceased and the plaintiff, the plaintiff had agreed 
to purchase the entire partnership business of the deceased and in consideration of 3,000 
shares in the plaintiff company, the deceased had agreed orally to transfer the said land 
on which the factory stood, to the plaintiff. However that oral agreement was not 
included as one of the terms in the purchase agreement, but the possession of the said 
land had always been with the plaintiff. By a writ issued on 14 April, 1985, the plaintiffs 
seeks inter alia, a declaration that the said land belongs to them and for an order of 
specific performance of the verbal agreement between the plaintiffs and the deceased, 
that the defendants do execute a transfer of the said land to the company and should the 
defendants refuse to sign all the documents to effect this transfer then the Senior 
Assistant Registrar be authorized to sign all documents on behalf of all the defendants to 
effect the transfer of the said land. 
 
Alauddin Mohd Sheriff J, found that the cause of action in this case occurred when there 
is an infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe the right of the 
plaintiff and his lordship pointed out that this had occurred when the defendants filed 
their defence to the plaintiff’s action on 14 April 1991. Thus the cause of action occurred 
on 14 April, 1991. Therefore, the defence that the plaintiff’s action was statute barred as 
contended by the defendants on the ground that the cause of action in this case had 
occurred on the 30 November 1970(the date of the agreement between the plaintiff and 
the deceased completed) or five months after the date of the death of the deceased (10th 
October, 1970), was untenable. 
 
His lordship again repeated that, relying on Ponnusamy, Nasri and Ho Ah Kim, an action 
for specific performance of a contract of sale of land is regarded also as an action to 
recover land and this ensues that the period of limitation is 12 years pursuant to section 9 
of the Limitation Act 1953.  
 
Similarly in Wong Sin Meng v. Wong Sam Moi & Anor31, Abdul Hamid Saad v. Aliyasak 
Ismail32 and Ibrahim Musa v. Bahari Nayan33 where the former first case involved 
applications to recover land, the second concerned on the application of the plaintiff for 
an order to retransfer back his land under ‘jual janji’ from the defendant to him under two 
agreement of Jual Janji and the third case pertained on an application for specific 
                                                 
30
 (1997) 5 CLJ 428. 
 
31
 (1991) 2 MLJ, p 277 
 
32
 (1998) 4 CLJ 429. 
 
33
 (1990) 2 CLJ 131(Rep) (1990) 2 CLJ 223. 
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performance of a sale and purchase of land. Likewise, these cases propounded that the 
limitation provided for such cases is 12 years because they are categorized as actions ‘for 
recovery of land’. 
 
In Kang Kok Hiang & Ors v. Ong Kah Hoe34, where it was found that the action of the 
plaintiff to have taken the action for a declaration that they are entitled to an undivided 
share of land against the defendant, was time barred because the action was taken after 
the expiration of 12 years from the date the accrual of the cause of action, pursuant to 
section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953.  
 
Again, in the latest case, Peng Bee Sdn. Bhd. lwn Teoh Liang Teh & Ors35 has obstinately 
decided that any action for specific performance of sale and purchase of land must be 
made within 12 years from the date of accrual of the cause of action.  In this case, two 
purchasers had, in 1980, entered into a contract of sale of land, whereby the purchasers 
agreed to purchase and the vendors agreed to sell a piece of land.  The purchasers had 
paid the deposit and part of the purchase prices to several proprietors/vendors. However, 
the vendors had defaulted and breached the contract in that they failed to proceed with 
the transaction to sell to the purchasers, instead they sold the land to third party. Likewise 
ironically, the sale to the third party could not be effected and completed due to the 
failure of the vendors to deliver vacant possession of the land. After more than 12 years 
from the accrual of the cause of action, the purchasers commenced the present action 
against the vendors to recover the land by way of action for specific performance.   
 
The court of appeal rejected their action because the action was brought in more than 12 
years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. Shaik Daud JCA had this to say: 
‘…In the present appeal we agree with the learned counsel for the first to 
fourth respondents that time began to run from the notice dated 7 June 
1982 following the inability of the first to fourth respondents to give 
vacant possession. The present action filed on 13 January 1995-more than 
12 years after the cause of action arose, is, we say, statute barred 
pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 (see Nasri lwn. Mesah).’36 
 
Finally, that limitation period for action for specific performance is considered as 
action to recover land and thus falls within the meaning of section 9 is also upheld 
in Dato’ Dr. Mohamed bin Taib v. Syed Abdullah bin Mohamad37,  
 
The Contrary Legal Contention 
                                                 
34
 (1994) 2 CLJ, 521. 
 
35
 (2001) 1 MLJ, 1. 
 
36
 Ibid, p, 4. 
 
37
 1995 MLJU LEXIS 600; (1995) 50 MLJU 1. 
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According to Visu Sinnadurai, it is submitted that action for specific performance of  
contract should not fall within the ambit of section 9 of the Limitation Act.38 An action 
for specific performance is not an action for recovery of land but an action to enforce a 
contract.39 Any party in contract, regardless whether he is the vendor or the purchaser, 
may take an action for specific performance40. This right is clearly founded pursuant to 
the terms of the contract entered into by the parties.41 Therefore, if an action is instituted 
by the purchaser to enforce a contract with due respect to the ratio of Thompson CJ in 
Ponnusamy, and Bradley J in Williams v. Thomas, it could not be said that the purchaser 
has taken an action to ‘recover the land’. This is because the land is still owned by the 
vendor and yet to be belonging to the purchaser nor had it been registered under the 
purchaser’s name.42 Hence, the limitation period should be 6 years. Alternatively, if an 
action for specific performance is examined in detail, one can submit that the action of 
the purchaser for specific performance is also an action to recover land.43 However, 
according to Visu Sinnadurai, the limitation period could not be different, regardless 
whether the action is brought by the purchaser nor the vendor.44  To illustrate this, take 
for example, say that Ali was the owner of a piece of land in Kodiang, Kedah sold his 
land to Abu for RM 10,000.00. If Ali as the vendor later refused to proceed with the 
contract and thus breached the contract, Abu as the purchaser can enforce it and applied 
for order of specific performance from the court to compel Ali to proceed with the 
contract. In this situation the action of specific performance commenced by Abu 
(purchaser), based on the ratio of Buckley and Thompson JJ in Williams and Ponnusamy, 
would be considered as an action to ‘recover land’. Thus the limitation period of the 
action would be 12 years pursuant to section 9(1). However, on the other hand, if in case 
Abu was the one who breached the contract for example, he abandoned his plan to buy 
the land, Ali as the vendor too could enforce the contract via the order of specific 
performance. In this situation, Ali as the vendor is not said to ‘recover the land’ but to 
‘enforce the contract’. Thus, if this ground, according to Buckley and Thompson JJ were 
to be followed, Ali’s action for specific performance does not fall to be an action to 
                                                 
38
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Butterworths, Singapore, 1984, p. 
440. 
 
39
 Ibid. 
 
40
 Ibid. 
 
41
 Ibid. 
 
42
 Ibid. However, in the author’s view, an action for specific performance of sale and purchase of land by 
the purchaser (who is yet to be registered as the proprietor) is not yet an action to recover the land because 
the title of the land is still under the name of the vendor.  
 
43
 Ibid. 
 
44
 Ibid. This is in order to validate his action, the purchaser must take the action within 6 years from the 
accrual of the cause of action pursuant to section 6 of the Limitation Act whilst for the vendor, he will of 
course ‘want to recover the land’ pursuant to section 9 and thus the limitation period is 12 years. Hence, the 
limitation period for both actions will be different.  
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‘recover land’ and thus, its limitation period would not be 12 years pursuant to section 
9(1). Instead, it falls on the general provision of ‘action founded on contract’ pursuant to 
section 6(1) and (6). Thus, based on this illustration, it is not logical to have different 
period of limitation for the same cause of action (action for specific performance by Ali 
(vendor) and Abu (purchaser)) as illustrated in Ali and Abu’s case. Thus in order to avoid 
this absurdity, it is better to consider the action for specific performance in the contract of 
sale of land as an action to enforce the contract and not an action to recover land. So that 
the same period of limitation would be applicable for both actions either they are 
instituted by the vendor or by the purchaser. 
 
Further, in most of the cases, where in any action for specific performance, the party who 
institutes the action too could claim damages in lieu of specific performance.45 An action 
for damages will be based on the breach of the contract committed by the other party. In 
the court’s trial, the party who has instituted the action may either choose to commence 
an action for damages without praying for specific performance or only claim specific 
performance of the contract. The action to claim for damages must be taken within a 
period of 6 years and not 12 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. 
Therefore, it can not be said that the period of limitation period will be different 
depending on the type of remedy chosen by the plaintiff which will be the basis of his 
claim: 6 years for claim for damages and 12 years for specific performance.46 Thus, it is 
submitted that this is illogical in suggesting that the period of limitation will be varied 
depending on the remedy sought, albeit the cause of action in both cases is similar viz 
breach of the contract.47 
 
If the contract is fully executed by the purchaser who has paid all the purchase prices but 
if there is some omission or breach on the part of vendor whereby he either fails to 
submit the document of title nor fails to effect the due transfer of the land in question in 
the form of statutory, the action of the purchaser to force and compel the vendor to 
exercise either of these terms could not become an action for specific performance.48 
                                                 
45
 McKenna v. Richey (1950) VLR 360; Johnson v. Agnew (1980) AC 367 HL. 
 
46
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Butterworths, Singapore, 1984, p. 
187. However, in Ho Ah Kim & Ors v. Paya Trubong Estate Sdn. Bhd. (1987) 1 MLJ, 143, even though 
paradoxically, an order for specific performance can be granted because the period of 12 years from the 
date of the accrual of the cause of action is yet to lapse, but because of the inability of the defendant to 
comply and exercise the order for specific performance the court had instead granted an order for damages 
and compensation to the plaintiff. This shows that the court in granting order for damages, even though the 
action was made after the period of 6 years, yet damages could still be granted by the court. This is because 
of section 18 of the Limitation Act which permits damages in lieu of specific performance, if the latter is 
found impractical to be granted.  
 
47
 Ibid, p. 441. 
 
48
 Ibid. 
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According to Visu Sinnadurai, the said action should be an action for specific relief49, or 
for a declaration50 as occurred in Ponnusamy.51 
 
According to Visu Sinnadurai, this view which holds that any action arises from  contract 
of sale and purchase of land is similar to ‘action for recovery of land’ and thus ensues 
that the limitation period for both is 12 years and not 6 years, is wrong.52  As mentioned 
before, section 6(6) of the Limitation Act clearly provides that the limitation period for 
any action founded on contract can also be ascertained by way of analogy with the 
limitation period for specific performance of contract.53 According to Visu Sinnadurai, 
Gill FJ erred in allowing himself to be influenced by the previous two cases which he had 
referred.54 This is because, according to Visu Sinnadurai, first in Ponnusamy, the action 
was not an action for specific performance of the contract entered into between the 
vendor and purchaser BUT an action for a declaratory order under section 4155 of the 
Specific Relief Act.56 Secondly, the reference made by His Lordships on the judgment of 
Ng Moh decided in the Federal Court was wrong because the issue of limitation period in 
the actions for specific performance had not been submitted or decided upon nor settled 
by the Federal Court, as the Federal Court had only accepted, without examining in 
detail, the concession of the counsels that the limitation period was 12 years.57 
 
Thus the decisions of the Federal Court in Ng Moh dan Nasri v. Mesah were made based 
on less reliable sources to support the contention that the limitation period for action of 
specific performance in contract of sale of land is 12 years.58 
 
In conclusion, according to Visu Sinnadurai, it can be said that the provisions in the 
Limitation Act require some amendment be made in explaining certain problems as that 
                                                 
49
 Ibid. See section 4 of the Specific Relief Act 1950.  
 
50
 Ibid. 
 
51
 (1959) MLJ 86. According to Visu Sinnadurai, in Ponnusamy, what the plaintiff should have done  
was to invoke section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 to claim for declaration of land.  
 
52
 Ibid, p. 440. 
 
53
 Ibid. 
 
54
 Ibid. 
 
55
 This section provides that any person entitled to declaration for the recovery of legal rights or character 
on any property by way of legal suit.  
 
56
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Butterworths, Singapore, 1984, p. 
440. 
 
57
 Ibid. 
 
58
 Similar to  Tan Swee Lan v. Engku Nik Binte Engku Muda (1973) 2 MLJ, 187. 
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have been discussed above, particularly on the scope of section 9.59 It is submitted that 
section 9 has been enacted to deal with situations in the acquisition of land, in particular, 
in adverse possession’s situations and not situations under contract.60 This is because this 
section is based on the English Act and was introduced in Malaysia without any 
consideration and question regarding its suitablitity to the system of registration under the 
Torrens system.61 The National Land Code does not recognize adverse possession and 
this has been provided in section 314 in that adverse possession on land for any period of 
time shall not bar nor estop any action for the recovery of land by the proprietor or any 
person having interest on the land and further to cement this, the Limitation Act 1953 
spells out that acts of adverse possession shall not in any circumstance negate the title 
and the interest of the actual properietor of the land.62 Therefore it is clear that until the 
decisions made in Ponnusamy, Ng Moh, Nasri, Ho Ah Kim, Tan Shiang Shong, Ahmad 
Said, Saw Gaik Beow, Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Bhd., Wong Sin Meng, Kang Kok 
Hiang, Abdul Hamid Said, Ibrahim Musa etc are revoked or an amendment on section 9 
is made, the parties in the same situations such as in these cases can take an action for the 
recovery of land in 12 years after the accrual of the cause of action.63 
 
Conclusion 
It is apparent that, the limitation period of an action for specific performance of a contract 
of sale of land and action for declaration of ownership on a land, based on the decided 
cases is 12 years from the date of the acrrual of the cause of action because both actions 
are regarded as actions for recovery of land pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act. 
Further too, based on the above decided cases, any action to recover ownership of land is 
presumed and regarded as action for specific performance. 
 
However, Visu Sinnadurai and the author are not in agreement on the conclusion that the 
limitation period for specific performance of contract of sale of land is 12 years. It should 
be 6 years. This is because:  
 
                                                 
59
 Visu Sinnadurai, The Sale and Purchase of Real Property in Malaysia, Butterworths, Singapore, 1984, p. 
441.  
 
60
 Ibid. See also the ratio of Buckley J in Williams v. Thomas.However, the statement propounded by Visu 
Sinnadurai that ‘section 9 has been enacted to deal with situations…, in particular, in adverse’s possession 
situations and not situations under contract’, should be read and understood with caution. This is because, 
there is not limitation period provided for action to possession of land under adverse possession. In adverse 
possession situation, the aggrieved party may institute the action at any time, pursuant to section 341 of the 
National Land Code 1965. See also Penang Realty Sdn Bhd v. Aznan bin Haji Ismail, (1996) MLJU LEXIS 
940; (1996) 310 MLJU 1. 
 
61
 Ibid. 
 
62
 Ibid. See also section  9(2) Limitation Act. 
 
63
 According to Visu Sinnadurai, there is no authority in the English law or in any commonwealth countries 
where similar provision as in section 9 could be applied in the actions instituted by the purchaser against 
the vendor.  
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a. The submission in Ng Moh stating that the limitation period for specific 
performance is 12 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action is weak 
because the judgment was made without relying on clear authority. The presiding 
judge only accepted the contention given by counsels; 
 
b. Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act itself provides that in any action founded on 
contract, the limitation period is 6 years.64 It is submitted that an action for 
specific performance of contract of sale and purchase of land is also an action 
founded on contract. Section 6(6) too supports this, in that it states, for action of 
specific performance of contract, the limitation period would be the same as that 
being provided for all action founded on contract. This ground is made up upon  
‘literal rule’s’65 scrutiny of the existing legal provision concerning limitation 
period for action on contract pursuant to section 6 of the Limitation Act; 
 
c. With due respect to the vague ratio of Thompson CJ in Ponnusamy who said that 
the sentence ‘save as hereinafter provided’ spelt out in section 6(1) means that the 
limitation period for specific performance of contract of sale of land is subject to 
section 9(1) because action for specific performance of sale of land is regarded as 
action to recover land. It is submitted albeit section 6 of the act provides that, 
‘save as hereinafter provided’, yet nothing in the Limitation Act which could 
clearly and unequivocally provide in coherent terms on the exception of the 
application of the limitation period of 6 years for action founded on contract 
which would include action for specific performance of sale and purchase of land. 
Again it is submitted his lordship disregarded the ‘literal rule’s’ approach; 
 
d. Even though section 9 provides that action for recovery of land must be made in 
12 years, yet it is submitted, this section shall not be applicable to limitation 
period for specific performance of contract which could include specific 
performance for contract of sale and purchase of land. This is because firstly, 
action for specific performance if closely observed, is not an action for recovery 
of land but, as what had been said by Visu Sinnadurai, it is sought in order to 
enforce a contract. Secondly, based on decided cases, with due respect with the 
ratio of Buckley J in Williams v. Thomas and Thompson CJ in Ponnusamy, action 
                                                 
64
 Similar to the meaning provided in section 6(6) of the said act. 
 
65
 The literal rule…is that, when the words of a statute are clear in their ordinary and natural sense, the 
court ought to follow that meaning, even if it results in an imporable interpretation. The court can only look 
at the words that parliament used. See JF Corkery, Starting Law, Scribblers Publishing, Australia, 1991, p 
148. In regard to literal rule, Lord Diplock explained in Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs (1980) 1 WLR 156 at p. 
157: 
 
‘Where the meaning of the statutory words, is plain dan unambiguous it is not for the 
judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain 
meaning because they themselves consider that the consequence of doing so would be 
inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral…Under our constitution it is Parliament’s opinion 
on these matters that is paramount’ 
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for specific performance on contract of sale of land is instituted at the time when 
the plaintiff is yet to be registered as the legal proprietor of the land concerned.66 
Hence, at the time he commences the action for specific performance, he could 
not be said as taking an action to ‘recover the land’. This argument is raised after 
considering this circumstance via the ‘golden rule’67 and also ‘literal rule’ 
approaches; 
  
e. His Lordships in Ho Ah Kim, Peng Bee, Tan Shiang Song, Ahmad Said, Saw Gaik 
Beow, Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Berhad, Wong Sin Meng, Abndul Hamid Saad, 
Ibrahim Musa, Kang Kok Hiang etc had only referred to the decisions in Nasri 
and Tan Swee Lan on the ground that he was bound to the ‘judicial precedent’ of 
these cases, without further examining its rationale and suitability to cases tried 
before hand;  
f. Section 9 provides clearly that the limitation period for action to recover land is 
12 years and it is submitted that this would not include action for specific 
performance on the contract of sale of land. It is submitted that section 9 is much 
more relevant to situations involving action of the chargee to auction off property 
of the chargor in cases involving security and mortgage transactions, action of a 
widow to enforce her rights over the deceased husband’s property and action for 
declaration of one’s ownership on land under a will;68. Again ‘literal rule’ 
approach applies in this argument; and, 
 
g. Normally in the prayer for specific performance, damages in lieu of specific 
performance will be prayed as well. If specific performance could not practically 
be granted, damages, in substitution to specific performance, will be granted by 
the court. It is illogical that the limitation period for specific performance is 12 
years and for damages is 6 years. Both remedies must have the same period of 
limitation because otherwise if an action for specific performance were to be 
brought after 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action, the courts would not 
be able to, in lieu thereof, grant damages as the period of limitation of 6 years for 
damages has expired. However this is bemused and difficult to reconcile because 
of Ho Ah Kim, where in this case, it was held that in lieu of specific performance, 
damages (compensation) had been granted by the court pursuant to section 18 of 
                                                 
66
 See also Nasri v.. Mesah (1971) 1 MLJ, p. 32, Peng Bee Sdn. Bhd. v.. Teoh Liang Teh & Ors (2001) 1 
MLJ, p. 1, Ho Ah Kim & Ors v. Paya Trubong Estate Sdn. Bhd.(1987) 1 MLJ, p. 143. Tan Swee Lian v. 
Engku Nik binti Engku Muda & Anor (1973) 2 MLJ, p.187. 
 
67
 In Gray v Pearson (10 ER 1216 at 1234), Lord Wensleydale, talking of wills and statutes, outlined the 
‘golden rule’ of interpretation: 
 
‘the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would 
lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the 
instrument…’ 
 
68
 See the obiter of Buckley J in Williams v. Thomas (1909) 1 Ch. 730 and Vandeleur v. Sloane (1919) 1 Ir. 
Rep. 116. 
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the Specific Relief Act 1950, albeit the limitation period for damages had expired 
viz more than 6 years. It is submitted that specific performance, including specific 
performance for contract of sale and purchase of land, should have 6 years 
limitation period similar to that of damages, so that it complies with section 6(1) 
of the Limitation Act and will tally with section 18 of the Specific Relief Act 
1950. Thus, for example, in case order for specific performance could not be 
granted, damages which has limitation period of 6 years, in lieu of specific 
performance, may altenatively could.  This reason and justitification is made after 
considering and applying ‘literal rule’, ‘golden rule’ and ‘mischief rule69’ 
approaches. 
 
To recapitulate, it is repeated again that, based on the decided cases, even though 
contrary to the opinions of Visu Sinnadurai and the author, application for specific 
performance in a contract of sale of land 70 and application for declaration of land fall 
under the same category of action viz action ‘to recover land’ as provided in section 9 of 
the Limitation Act.71 Thus, the limitation period for the plaintiff to commence an action 
for specific performance should be made within 12 years from the date of the accrual of 
the cause of action. 
 
Alternatively, if the plaintiff only applied damages without praying for specific 
performance, EXCEPT if the application for damages is made in substitution to or in lieu 
of specific performance,72 it is submitted that he should take the action within 6 years 
from the date of the accrual of the cause of action as required under section 6(1) or 6(6) 
of the Limitation Act. This is because this application is not an application to ‘recover 
land’ according to section 9 of the Limitation Act but it is an action founded on 
contract.73 Example of this action is an action commenced by the purchaser for damages 
due to the delay of the developer to deliver vacant possession of the property to the 
                                                 
69
 The mischief rule says that the judge must adopt that construction with suppresses the mischief and 
advances the remedy, according to the intent of the makers of the Act. Today, when the court says that it is 
seeking the ‘purpose’ of the statute, it is really referring to the ‘mischief’ rule. The court may refer to the 
‘object’ or ‘aim’ as well as the ‘purpose’ of the statute. They mean the same thing.  See 
J.F Corkery, Starting Law, Scribblers Publishing, Australia, 1999, p. 150. 
 
70
 The limitation period of an action for specific performance to contracts other than contract of sale of land 
is 6 years.  See J & Wong Logging Contractor v. Arab Malaysian Eagle Assurance Bhd.(1993) 1 MLJ, 240, 
New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd v. Ong Choon Lin (t/a Syarikat Federal Motor Trading) (1992) 1 MLJ, p. 
185 and Sia Siew Hong & Ors v. Lim Gim Chian & Anor (1995) 3 MLJ, p. 141 
 
71
 Whether the category to claim damages in lieu of specific performance also falls within the meaning of 
‘recovery of land’ could yet be confirmed. However, section 18 of the Limiation Act allows application for 
damages if specific performance could not obtain.. 
 
72
 As that been stated in section 18 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. See also Ho Ah Kim & Ors v. Paya 
Trubong Estate Sdn. Bhd 
 
73
 Ought not application for specific performance founded upon contract as well?. Thus, it is also subject to 
section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953. 
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purchaser in the contract of sale and purchase of property, which is governed by Housing 
Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966.74 
 
Regarding Ponnusamy, Wong Sin Meng, Kang Kok Hiang and Abdul Hamid Saad which 
involved applications for declaration of land, the plaintiffs did not specifically prayed for 
specific performance of the contract of sale entered into. It is an irony to note that the 
plaintiffs had not applied for specific performance in that case. In the author’s opinion, 
the failure of the plaintiffs to have prayed specific performance could tarnish his action. 
This is because, specific performance is ‘a decree issued by the court that the defendant 
shall actually perform and carry out the promise that he has made, or the obligation, 
expressly or impliedly, cast upon him by the conduct between the parties’. This relief has 
been so clearly provided in section 11 of the Specific Relief Act, but on the other hand 
application for declaration of land is made pursuant to section 40 of the same Act. Action 
for specific performance, it is submitted, is founded and dependent on the existence of 
contract75 whilst application for declaration of land is made, it is submitted, could only be 
made when there is apparent, based on the evidence,  there is no contract.76 It can exist 
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 Insun Development Sdn. Bhd v. Azali Bakar (1996) 2 MLJ, p. 188,  Loh Wai Lian v Sea Housing 
Corporation Sdn. Bhd. (1984) 2 MLJ, p. 280 and Loh Wai Lian v. Sea Housing Corporation Sdn. Bhd. 
(1987) 2 MLJ, p. 1. 
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 See Peng Bee Sdn. Bhd., Ho Ah Kim, Ahmad Said, Saw Gaik Beow, Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Berhad, 
Ibrahim Musa 
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 See for example in Ng Chim & Ors v Low Boon Beng (1994) 3 CLJ 803 where in this case the plaintiffs 
and the defendant obtained undivided pieces of land as one of the beneficiaries of a deceased person 
proprietor of the land concerned and this land had been transmitted to them in 1972. However, the 
plaintiffs’ undivided shares were registered in the name of the defendant under a purported agreement to 
transfer the land to the plaintiffs by the defendant for RM3,000.00. The defendant occupied and cultivated 
the land without interference by the plaintiffs for 16 years. In 1988, the plaintiffs commenced an action  of 
declaration, against the defendants, for recovery of the same upon the failure of the defendants to comply to 
their request to retransfer back the said land to the plaintiffs. However, this action was struck off by the 
court on the ground that the action was statute barred pursuant to section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953. It 
is further submitted that in Abdul Hamid Saad v. Aliyasak Ismail (1998) 4 CLJ 429, where this case 
involved a declaration of the plaintiff to recover back his land under two ‘jual janji’ agreements after he 
had paid all debts owed to the defendant. However, it is irony to find that the plaintiff did not only apply for 
specific performance, instead he applied an action of declaration ‘to recover the land’. Thus the period of 
limitation was 12 years pursuant to section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953. It is submitted, with due 
respect, that this application of the plaintiff to have applied action of declaration for the recovery of land 
was wrong. Instead, he should have applied for specific performance pursuant to the two agreements of 
‘jual janji’ entered into between him and the defendant. See also Kang Kok Hiang & Ors v. Ong Kah Hoe 
(1994) 2 CLJ 521. 
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and founded, based on circumstances such as under a will or trust.77 It is submitted thaton 
this account, the action of the plaintiff for declaration of land in Ponnusamy, Wong Sin 
Meng, Abdul Hamid, Kang Kok Hiang were irred and should be duly rejected. Further, 
due to the failure of the plaintiffs to specifically plead the order for specific performance, 
pursuant to section 41 also, the court should not have granted their applications for such 
declarations. This is because according to the proviso of section 41 which says  
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 See Ng Chim & Ors v Low Boon Beng (1994) 3 CLJ 803 and illustration a and b in section 41 Specific 
Relief Act. 
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‘provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the 
plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, 
omits to do so’ 
 
It is submitted that the sentence ‘further relief than a mere declaration’ above, can also 
mean application for specific performance.  Therefore, based on the submissions and 
performance of contract of sale of land it is suggested that a few provisions in the 
Limitation Act 1953 should be amended or future cases involving the same issue should 
apply the suggestion as put forward by the author above, in settling the issues arose. 
Finally, on matter pertaining to declaratory order prayed instead of specific performance, 
in actions involving contract, it is suggested that this also should be rectified and rightly 
applied in future cases based on the grounds as set out above opinions on the above 
inconsistency in regard to the limitation period for order of specific. 
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